US News
CBP Launches CAPE Tool for IEEPA Duty Refunds and IEEPA Duty Refund Process
Authored by: Dr. Peter Koenig · Arpit Bhargava · Radhika Sharma
SBA Group. | April 16, 2026
Executive Summary
On April 20, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will launch Phase I of the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) tool. This tool streamlines the refund process for duties paid under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which were recently ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court.
Importers must act quickly to categorize their entries and determine if they qualify for the CAPE automated process or if a formal protest is required.
Eligibility Checklist
Understanding which entries can be processed through CAPE is critical for ensuring your company receives its entitled refunds.
✅ YES: Eligible for CAPE
The following entry types can be submitted via the CAPE Declaration:
- Unliquidated entries.
- Liquidated entries that are up to 80 days past their liquidation date.
❌ NO: Not Eligible for CAPE
The following entries cannot be processed through the tool and require alternative handling:
- Entries subject to AD/CVD with pending Department of Commerce liquidation instructions.
- Entries covered by an open protest.
- Entries not filed in ACE.
- Entries already flagged for reconciliation.
- Entries on drawback claims.
- Entries where liquidation is final (beyond the 80-day window for CAPE).
Critical Action Items
- Identify “The 80-to-180 Day Gap”
If an entry is more than 80 days past liquidation but less than 180 days, it is ineligible for CAPE.
Action: You must file a formal protest before the 180-day deadline to preserve your right to a refund. Do not wait for the CAPE tool if your entries fall into this window.
- Prepare Data Files
Claims are submitted via a CAPE Declaration (CSV file).
- Each file is limited to 9,999 entries.
Action: Compile an Excel master list of all entry numbers for which IEEPA duties were paid to facilitate a smooth CSV upload on April 20, 2026.
- Determine Who Will File
- Importers of Record (IOR): Can submit for all their own entries. SBA’s team of experts is guiding clients to setup ACE accounts and process entries.
- Customs Brokers: Can submit only for entries they originally filed.
Action: Coordinate with your trade compliance team or broker to ensure no entries are missed or double-filed.
IEEPA Duty Refund Process
To ensure your company successfully recovers duties paid under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) tool. This system streamlines refunds through batch processing via the ACE Secure Data Portal.
Introduction: The ACE Secure Data Portal
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) Secure Data Portal is the primary “single window” through which the trade community reports imports and exports and connects with CBP.
For the purposes of IEEPA refunds, the ACE Portal serves as the mandatory interface for:
- Data Management: Uploading bulk refund requests via the CAPE tool.
- Financial Setup: Managing the bank account details required for ACH disbursements.
- Status Tracking: Receiving validation confirmation and unique CAPE claim numbers.
If your company does not already have an account, establishing one is the first prerequisite before any refund actions can be taken.
Process Workflow for IEEPA Refunds
| Phase | Step | Action Item |
| Account in ACE Portal | To initiate the IEEPA tariff refund process, the Account Owner must establish or verify the company’s Top Account within the ACE Secure Data Portal. This involves configuring activity-specific Sub-Accounts (Importer/Broker views) and authorizing User Profiles to ensure the team has the necessary permissions to pull trade data and submit electronic refund claims. Note: Companies may coordinate this setup through their Licensed Customs Broker, or alternatively, the company can file and manage this entire refund process with the specialized assistance of the SBA Team of Experts. |
| 2. Preparation | Data Audit | Compile a comprehensive list of entry numbers where IEEPA duties were paid. |
| Bank Setup | Ensure your ACE Portal account has active bank details on file for ACH refunds (Note: This is separate from payment accounts). | |
| 3. Submission | File Creation | Prepare a Comma-Separated Values (.CSV) file containing all eligible entry numbers. |
| Upload | The importer or authorized customs broker uploads the .CSV via the CAPE tool in the ACE Portal. | |
| 4. Validation | Verification | ACE validates the Declaration and the individual entry summaries listed in the file. |
| Receipt | Upon successful validation, the filer is issued a unique CAPE claim number. | |
| 5. Disbursement | ACH Payment | CBP issues the validated refund directly to the bank account on file. |
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) – CAPE and IEEPA Refunds
1. What is the “CAPE” tool?
CAPE stands for Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries. It is a new batch-handling tool designed to simplify the refund process by allowing many entries to be submitted at once rather than individually.
2. Which entries are ELIGIBLE for refund through the CAPE system as of April 20, 2026?
- Unliquidated entries, and
- Liquidated entries that are up to 80 days past their liquidation date.
3. Which entries are INELIGIBLE for refund through the CAPE system as of April 20, 2026?
- Entries subject to AD/CVD with pending Department of Commerce liquidation instructions.
- Entries covered by an open protest.
- Entries not filed in ACE.
- Entries already flagged for reconciliation.
- Entries on drawback claims.
- Entries where liquidation is final (beyond the 80-day window for CAPE).
4. What should companies do in case their entries are ineligible for refund through CAPE system?
Companies must consult their legal counsel to explore remedies through the Court of International Trade (CIT) to preserve their rights of refund for entries that are unprotested beyond 180 days after liquidation. For entries not yet identified for refund by CAPE — such as those subject to AD/CVD or covered by pending protests — clients may await guidance from the CIT, or place the matter before the CIT through their legal counsel if the matter has already been appealed. As noted above, we recommend uploading all entries including AD/CVD-affected ones to CAPE now to preserve optionality pending further court action.
5. Who is authorized to file for these refunds?
The authorized customs broker who originally filed the entries may submit a CAPE Declaration. Alternatively, importer of record (IOR) may coordinate this setup through the ACE system to file and manage this entire refund process. SBA’s team of custom experts is helping clients compile, validate and upload these forms to the CAPE system for effective reconciliation.
6. How will our company receive the money?
All refunds are paid electronically via Automated Clearing House (ACH). You must have bank account details specifically designated for refunds on file in the ACE Portal, or the refund will not be processed.
7. What happens if we encounter technical issues during the upload?
CBP has established two dedicated support channels:
- Technical Issues: IEEPARefunds@cbp.dhs.gov
- General Policy/Trade Questions: Traderelations@cbp.dhs.gov
8. Can we submit the request via paper or email?
No. All bank information and CAPE Declarations must be submitted electronically through the ACE Secure Data Portal.
Note: Ensure your internal trade compliance team cross-references the .CSV entry list against your internal ERP system before submission to avoid validation errors in the ACE Portal, which could delay the issuance of your CAPE claim number.
The Supreme Court Decides: IEEPA Tariffs Unlawful
By: Arpit Bhargava
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in V.O.S. Selections Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs because Congress never delegated that specific taxing power in the statute; consequently, all IEEPA tariffs were unlawful ab initio (from the start).
This ruling effectively dismantles the cornerstone of the administration’s aggressive trade agenda, invalidating the “reciprocal” tariffs and the targeted drug-trafficking duties on imports from China, Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and India.
Other trade regimes are not affected by this decision. This includes Section 232 national security tariffs (on steel, autos, aluminum, automobiles, semiconductors, solar panels, copper, and wood), Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods related to unfair trade practices, and standard antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD).
White House Reloaded: Section 122 Tariffs In, For Now
On February 20, 2026, President Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to proclaim a new 10 percent global import surcharge to address “large and serious” U.S. balance-of-payments deficits. This new duty is scheduled to take effect at 12:01 a.m. EST on February 24, 2026. While classified as a “regular customs duty,” it operates as an additional surcharge collected over existing normal tariffs, though it does not stack with goods already subject to Section 232 national security measures.
Goods loaded on a vessel and already in transit to the United States before 12:01 a.m. EST on February 24, 2026, and imported before 12:01 a.m. EST on February 28, 2026, are also not covered by the section 122 surcharge. Key exclusions to the section 122 surcharge include critical minerals, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, oil, and petrochemical products etc. A full list is available in Annex I and Annex II of the executive order.
By statute, this temporary import surcharge is limited to a maximum duration of 150 days and is currently scheduled to expire on July 24, 2026, unless extended by an act of Congress. Importers should be aware that the administration must meet specific statutory requirements regarding the balance-of-payments deficit to invoke Section 122, which may face future legal challenges. For a detailed analysis of this Executive Order and its specific regulatory impact, please refer to SBA’s US News page.
Status of Injunction on IEEPA Tariffs
There is currently no active nationwide injunction from the Supreme Court as to imposing IEEPA duties, as the Court vacated the preliminary injunction initially issued by the D.C. District Court for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the V.O.S. Selections case back to the Court of International Trade (CIT) to reconsider the proper scope of relief as to the found illegal IEEPA tariffs. However, on February 20, 2026, President Trump issued the Executive Order “Ending Certain Tariff Actions,” which formally rescinds the additional ad valorem duties previously imposed under IEEPA authorities. This order officially directs that the collection of these invalidated duties must cease as soon as practicable. Thus, for now the collection continues and retroactive refund of prior IEEPA duties not addressed.
U.S. businesses are still paying IEEPA tariffs even after the Supreme Court decision to strike down President Trump’s IEEPA tariffs, until CBP advises otherwise. It could take days or weeks for CBP to officially tell importers that the IEEPA tariffs are no longer in force to be paid.
Refunds of IEEPA Tariffs and Remedies going forward
The Supreme Court did not create a special refund mechanism. Importers will need to use existing Customs and court processes to seek refunds, and the options available depend on whether entries are liquidated or unliquidated. It could be months before the lower courts or US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) establish any refund process. The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) is expected to oversee the refund process, which will be administered electronically by CBP once the court and/or CBP issues specific implementation orders. At least for now, the U.S. Administration is signaling that there could be years of litigation on this issue but has certainly shown that U.S. Administration policy can change rapidly.
- Importers who have already filed protective lawsuits in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) are expected to have a clear path forward through court-ordered reliquidation. The CIT is well-positioned to order relief in these pending 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) cases, and CBP has previously indicated it will not oppose reliquidation if the Supreme Court holds the tariffs unlawful.
- Unliquidated entries (PSC route). For entries that have not yet liquidated, the primary duty relief tool is Post Summary Correction (PSC), which allows correction of duty calculations before liquidation. PSCs generally may be filed on entries within about 300 days of importation and at least 15 days before scheduled liquidation; once an entry liquidates, PSCs are no longer available.
- Liquidated entries (protest and litigation route). After liquidation, refund claims shift to protests. Importers generally have 180 days from liquidation or reliquidation to file a protest. If CBP denies a protest, importers may challenge that denial at the CIT within 180 days. Note also that as to import entries liquidated more than 180 days ago, such that cannot now protest their liquidation, as the statutory time to do so has expired, can still file a 1581(i) court case (per the first bullet point above) that covers up to two years back from the time of the court appeal as a protective measure at this point, if wish
Importers should note that when products are also subject to anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD), the treatment of these refunds in dumping margin calculations requires a more complex AD/CVD law specific analysis to ensure proper treatment in administrative reviews, having nothing to do with IEEPA.
Note that most importers did not file court appeals yet as to the IEEPA tariffs. Much of Corporate America is pushing for a general refund of all IEEPA tariffs for all, which could be done if the U.S. Administration were willing to do so (so far not). With (a) impending November 2026 Congressional mid-term elections coming, (b) the huge unpopularity of the IEEPA tariffs among American voters, (c) Trump’s increasing unpopularity in the U.S. with resistance to Trump growing, (d) Trump’s Republican Members of Congress worried as to their own re-election in November 2026, and (e) the $140+ billion of collected IEEPA tariffs so far (with implications for the U.S. budget deficit), interesting dynamics are set into play with unclear/uncertain resolution at this point as to how it plays out.
Further practical next steps for importers:
- Inventory all entries where IEEPA tariffs were paid. Confirm which entries are still unliquidated and which have liquidated, including the relevant dates, to assess best steps going forward as to above.
Entry Status | Administrative Action Required | Statutory Deadline | Expected Disbursement Mechanism |
Unliquidated | File Post-Summary Correction (PSC) via ACE | Within 300 days, up to 15 days prior to scheduled liquidation | Refunded at final liquidation via ACH |
Liquidated | File Formal Protest (Form CF-19) under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 | Strictly 180 days from the date of liquidation. | Electronic ACH transfer (subject to CBP review) |
Litigated | Adherent to CIT reliquidation implementation orders | Subject to CIT scheduling | Court-ordered reliquidation via CBP ACH system |
Join our panel of experts in the webinar series “Decoding US Tariffs” through February 24, 2026, to March 19, 2026, to get updates. Click here to register.
The professionals at SBA have deep experience advising clients on the range of issues associated with the IEEPA tariffs, the US Customs and Border Protection’s operational and administrative process for tracking and seeking refunds, and the disposition of those tariffs on appeal.
Our team includes Arpit Bhargava, Founding Partner and CEO, who is a Chartered Accountant and master’s in business law with rich experience in international trade laws and practice, and Dr. Peter Koenig, who brings almost 40 years of experience in international trade regulation, including antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, U.S. Customs, and trade policy. For more information, please contact any of the authors or another professional at SBA that you regularly work with.
White House Reloaded: Section 122 Tariffs In, For Now
By: Dr. Peter Koenig
The legal and economic landscape of United States trade policy underwent a fundamental realignment on February 20, 2026, the same day the Supreme Court invalidated the executive branch’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for broad-based tariffs. In an immediate response, President Trump proclaimed a new 10 percent global import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. This strategic shift serves to address “fundamental international payments problems” while bypassing the judicial constraint that requires an express delegation from Congress for tariff imposition. Effective February 24, 2026, this surcharge applies on an across-the-board basis for 150 days—currently scheduled through July 24, 2026—unless specifically exempted through the technical framework detailed in Annex I and Annex II.
Section 122 authorizes the President to impose temporary, “non-discriminatory” surcharges of up to 15 percent ad valorem to restore international economic equilibrium. Media sources have noted that Mr. Trump may increase this duty to 15%, which is maximum permissible for cush action under the Trade Act. The initial action imposes a 10 percent rate that applies in addition to existing tariffs, though it excludes USMCA-qualifying goods and articles already subject to Section 232 restrictions—where Section 232 applies only to a portion of a product, the Section 122 surcharge applies to the remainder.
Goods loaded on a vessel and already in transit to the United States before 12:01 a.m. EST on February 24, 2026, and imported before 12:01 a.m. EST on February 28, 2026, are also not covered by the section 122 surcharge. Key exclusions to the section 122 surcharge include critical minerals, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, oil, and petrochemical products etc. A full list is available in the executive order.
By statute, this temporary import surcharge is strictly limited to a maximum duration of 150 days and is currently scheduled to expire on July 24, 2026, unless extended by an act of Congress.
Notably, the proclamation has already drawn legal scrutiny; critics suggest the administration may have violated Section 122 by potentially failing to satisfy specific statutory triggers, which include large and serious balance-of-payments deficits, an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or the need to cooperate with other countries in correcting a payments disequilibrium. In potential court challenges, the administration will be required to demonstrate that these rigorous financial requirements were met to justify the ongoing use of the surcharge.
Join our panel of experts in the webinar series “Decoding US Tariffs” through February 24, 2026, to March 19, 2026, to get updates. Click here to register.
The professionals at SBA have deep experience advising clients on the range of issues associated with the US tariffs and the US Customs and Border Protection’s operational and administrative procedures. Our team includes Arpit Bhargava, Founding Partner and CEO, who is a Chartered Accountant and Master in Business Law with rich experience in international trade laws and practice, and Dr. Peter Koenig, who brings almost 40 years of experience in international trade regulation, including antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, U.S. Customs, and trade policy. For more information, please contact any of the authors or another professional at SBA that you work with.
List of HS codes excluded from Section 122 Surcharge
as per Annex I and Annex II
| USHTS Code | Description | Country of Origin | Chapter 9903 Heading |
| 0201.10.05 | Bovine carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled: Described in general note 15 of the tariff schedule and entered pursuant to its provisions. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0201.10.10 | Bovine carcasses and halves, fresh or chilled, described in additional U.S. note 3 to chapter 2 of the HTSUS. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0201.20.02 | High-quality beef cuts, bone in, processed, fresh or chilled, described in general note 15 of the HTSUS. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0201.30.80 | Bovine meat cuts, boneless, fresh or chilled, not described in general note 15 or additional U.S. note 3. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0206.21.00 | Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen: Tongues. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0702.00.20 | Tomatoes, fresh or chilled, if entered March 1 to July 14, or Sept 1 to Nov 14 in any year. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0709.99.10 | Chayote (Sechium edule), fresh or chilled. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0801.11.00 | Coconuts, desiccated. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0804.40.00 | Avocados, fresh or dried. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0805.90.01 | Etrogs. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 0811.90.80 | Tropical fruit, nesoi, frozen, whether or not previously steamed or boiled. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 0901.11.00 | Coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated: Coffee, not roasted: Not decaffeinated. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0902.10.10 | Green tea (not fermented) in immediate packings of a content not exceeding 3 kg: Flavored. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 0904.21.20 | Fruits of the genus Capsicum or of the genus Pimenta, dried, neither crushed nor ground: Paprika. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 1404.90.90 | Date palm branches, Myrtus branches or other vegetable material, for religious purposes only. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 1602.50.08 | Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood: Of bovine animals: In airtight containers: Valued not over $1.56/kg. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 1905.90.10 | Bread, pastry, cakes, etc., for religious purposes only. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 1905.90.90 | Bakers’ wares, communion wafers, sealing wafers, for religious purposes only. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2008.99.21 | Acai (otherwise prepared or preserved). | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2009.31.60 | Citrus juice of any single citrus fruit (non-orange/grape/lime), Brix <= 20, concentrated. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2009.89.70 | Coconut water or juice of acai. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2009.90.40 | Coconut water juice blends, not from concentrate, packaged for retail sale. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2106.90.99 | Acai preparations for the manufacture of beverages. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 2825.50.30 | Copper oxides and hydroxides: Other. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 2922.50.50 | Amino-alcohol-phenols, amino-acid-phenols and other amino-compounds with oxygen function: Other. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 2934.99.01 | Nucleic acids and their salts: Other: Mycophenolate mofetil. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 2935.90.20 | Sulfonamides: Other: Other: Drugs. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 3301.29.51 | Essential oils other than those of citrus fruit, nesoi, for religious purposes only. | All Sources | 9903.03.04 |
| 3901.90.90 | Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms: Other: Other, nesoi. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 3917.21.00 | Tubes, pipes and hoses, and fittings therefore: Rigid: Of polymers of ethylene (limited to “Aircraft” scope). | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 4001.22.00 | Natural rubber in other forms: Technically specified natural rubber (TSNR). | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 7106.91.10 | Silver, unwrought or in semi manufactured forms: Other: Unwrought: Bullion and dore. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 8542.39.00 | Electronic integrated circuits: Other. | All Sources | 9903.03.03 |
| 9903.01.31 | Informational materials (publications, films, posters, recordings, news wire feeds, etc.). | All Sources | 9903.03.11 |
| Any | Originating goods qualifying for USMCA preferential treatment under General Note 11. | Canada | 9903.03.07 |
| Any | Originating goods qualifying for USMCA preferential treatment under General Note 11. | Mexico | 9903.03.08 |
| Any | Articles subject to Section 232 national security import restrictions (steel, aluminum, etc.). | All Sources | 9903.03.06 |
| Any | Specified textile and apparel articles entered duty-free under relevant FTAs (e.g., CAFTA-DR). | Specified FTA Partners | 9903.03.09 |
SBA TRADELAW INC. | CLIENT Q&A GUIDE
Section 232 Tariff Overhaul: What You Need to Know
Steel, Aluminum & Copper | Presidential Proclamation of April 2, 2026
Authored by: Dr. Peter Koenig · Arpit Bhargava · Radhika Sharma · Piyush Tainwala
SBA Group | April 3, 2026
On April 2, 2026, the White House issued a Presidential Proclamation that fundamentally restructures the Section 232 tariff regime covering steel, aluminum, and copper. The changes affect duty rates, how duties are calculated, and which products are covered. This guide answers the questions we are hearing most from clients — in plain language.
Note: This analysis is preliminary and subject to revision as we review agency guidance and consult with stakeholders.
⚠ CRITICAL DEADLINE: New rules apply to all goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse on or after 12:01 a.m. EST, Monday, April 6, 2026.
Section I — The Basics
Q: What exactly changed on April 2, 2026?
A: President Trump signed a Proclamation that rewrites three key elements of the existing Section 232 tariff framework: (1) how duties are calculated — now on the full customs value of the product, not just its metal content; (2) the duty rates themselves, which now vary by product tier; and (3) which products are covered, with some items added and others removed.
Q: Who does this affect?
A: If your business imports — or relies on suppliers who import — any of the following, you are affected: steel, aluminum, or copper in raw or semi-finished form; finished goods made substantially from these metals; industrial or electrical equipment with significant metal components. Exporters shipping to the U.S. market are equally impacted.
Q: When do the new rules take effect?
A: April 6, 2026 at 12:01 a.m. EST. Any goods already in transit and entered before that date-time are generally subject to the old rules, but you should verify this with your customs broker for your specific entries.
Q: What is Section 232, and why does it matter?
A: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 allows the President to impose tariffs on imports that threaten U.S. national security. Unlike ordinary tariffs, Section 232 duties can be imposed quickly and without Congressional approval. They sit on top of any existing duties — meaning your total landed duty cost is the sum of normal customs duties plus the Section 232 rate.
Section II — The New Duty Rates
Q: What are the new duty rates at a glance?
The new structure uses three tiers based on how metal-intensive your product is:
| Annex | Products | Base Rate | US-Origin Rate |
| I-A | Core Metals & Primary Derivatives | 50% | 10% |
| I-B | Secondary Derivatives | 25% | 10% |
| III | Industrial & Grid Equipment | 15% floor* | 15% floor* |
* Annex III floor rate applies until December 31, 2027, after which these products move to Annex I-B (25%).
The table below summarizes the broad product categories covered across each Annex, based on the White House publication dated April 2, 2026. For full HTS-code level detail, consult the source Annexes directly.
| Annex | Products | Base Rate | US-Origin Rate |
| I-A (50%) | Raw Steel | 50% | Ingots, billets, slabs, blooms — nonalloy, stainless & alloy steel |
| I-A (50%) | Flat-Rolled Steel | 50% | Hot- & cold-rolled coils/sheets/strip (wide & narrow); clad, plated or coated products (HTS 7208–7212) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Bars, Rods & Sections | 50% | Hot-rolled bars & rods in coils; angles, beams, channels, H/I/U sections (HTS 7213–7216) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Wire | 50% | Nonalloy, stainless and alloy steel wire (HTS 7217, 7223, 7229) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Tubes & Pipes | 50% | Seamless & welded pipes, hollow profiles, OCTG (HTS 7304–7306) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Structural Products | 50% | Sheet piling, railway track construction material (HTS 7301, 7302) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Derivatives — Fittings & Fasteners | 50% | Pipe fittings, flanges, threaded fittings, screws, bolts, nuts, rivets, washers (HTS 7307, 7318) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Derivatives — Structures & Containers | 50% | Bridges, towers, doors/windows, scaffolding, tanks, drums, compressed gas containers (HTS 7308–7311) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Derivatives — Wire Products | 50% | Stranded wire, ropes, cables, barbed wire, fencing, grill & netting (HTS 7312–7314) |
| I-A (50%) | Steel Derivatives — Chains, Springs & Misc. | 50% | Chains, anchors, nails, tacks, springs, pins, needles, grinding balls (HTS 7315–7320, 7325–7326) |
| I-A (50%) | Raw Aluminum | 50% | Unwrought aluminum, bars, rods, profiles, wire, sheets, foil (HTS 7601, 7604–7607) |
| I-A (50%) | Aluminum Tubes, Pipes & Fittings | 50% | Seamless & welded tubes, pipe fittings and couplings (HTS 7608–7609) |
| I-A (50%) | Aluminum Castings & Forgings | 50% | Cast and forged aluminum articles (HTS 7616) |
| I-A (50%) | Aluminum Derivatives — Structures & Containers | 50% | Aluminum doors/windows, structural sections, collapsible tubes, drums, gas containers (HTS 7610–7613) |
| I-A (50%) | Aluminum Derivatives — Cable & Wire | 50% | Stranded wire, electrical conductors, cables with steel core (HTS 7614) |
| I-A (50%) | Copper — Primary Forms | 50% | Copper/brass/bronze bars, rods, profiles, wire in all alloy forms (HTS 7406–7408) |
| I-A (50%) | Copper — Flat Products | 50% | Plates, sheets, strip and foil — refined copper and all copper alloys (HTS 7409–7410) |
| I-A (50%) | Copper — Tubes, Pipes & Fittings | 50% | Seamless & other tubes/pipes; fittings for all copper alloys (HTS 7411–7412) |
| I-A (50%) | Copper — Wire, Fasteners & Articles | 50% | Stranded wire, cables, nails, washers, screws, rivets, springs, sanitary ware, table/kitchen articles (HTS 7413–7419) |
| I-B (25%) | Domestic Appliances & Cookware | 25% | Gas/liquid fuel stoves, ranges, grates, space heaters, washers, dryers, dishwashers, refrigerators, freezers, A/C units |
| I-B (25%) | Household Articles & Cutlery | 25% | Sinks, baths, sanitary ware, table & kitchen articles, cookware, cutlery, flatware (spoons, forks, ladles) |
| I-B (25%) | Hardware & Building Fittings | 25% | Hinges, door closers, mountings, fittings for buildings and furniture, staples, flexible tubing, stoppers & caps |
| I-B (25%) | Industrial Machinery & Equipment | 25% | Pumps, compressors, valves, heat exchangers, turbines, generators, transformers, electric motors, bearings, gears |
| I-B (25%) | Construction & Earthmoving Equipment | 25% | Bulldozers, graders, scrapers, excavators, loaders, cranes, hoists, forklift trucks |
| I-B (25%) | Agricultural Machinery | 25% | Tractors, plows, mowers, combine harvesters, threshers and parts thereof |
| I-B (25%) | Railway Equipment | 25% | Locomotives, passenger coaches, tank cars, freight wagons, track maintenance vehicles, couplers, truck assemblies |
| I-B (25%) | Road Vehicles & Parts | 25% | Tractors for semi-trailers, motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, bumpers, gear boxes, mufflers, clutches |
| I-B (25%) | Electrical Equipment | 25% | Transformers, AC motors, wind turbine generators, electrical conductors, conduit tubing, antennae |
| I-B (25%) | Wind Energy Components | 25% | Wind turbine towers, gear boxes, blades, hubs, AC generators and parts (covered across steel & aluminum derivatives) |
| I-B (25%) | Containers & Prefabricated Structures | 25% | Intermodal shipping containers, prefabricated steel buildings |
| I-B (25%) | Aluminum Cookware & Household Articles | 25% | Cast & non-cast aluminum bakeware, cooking ware, kitchen articles, sanitary ware, luggage frames, ladders, venetian blinds |
| I-B (25%) | Copper Electrical Conductors | 25% | Insulated copper conductors for telecom and general use (≤1,000 V), fitted with connectors |
| II (Exempt) | Food & Dairy Products | 0% | Concentrated milk and cream (sweetened); food preparations not canned or frozen |
| II (Exempt) | Chemicals & Refrigerants | 0% | HFCs, HFOs, propylene, oxygen, helium; steam cylinder oils; antifreeze; solvents and thinners |
| II (Exempt) | Paints, Coatings & Adhesives | 0% | Paints and varnishes (all polymer types, aqueous and non-aqueous); mastics and putties; adhesive preparations |
| II (Exempt) | Personal Care & Cosmetics | 0% | Perfumes, shampoos, deodorants, cosmetics, skin care, hair preparations, oral hygiene products |
| II (Exempt) | Cleaning & Polishing Products | 0% | Detergents, surface-active preparations, lubricants, polishes, scouring compounds |
| II (Exempt) | Pesticides & Disinfectants | 0% | Insecticides, herbicides, disinfectants, fungicides — all packaging sizes |
| II (Exempt) | Cast Iron Cookware | 0% | Cast iron bakeware and kitchen articles (enameled and non-enameled) |
| II (Exempt) | Motorcycles & Parts | 0% | Motorcycles (>250cc, >800cc, electric); parts and accessories for motorcycles |
| II (Exempt) | Medical / Military Vehicles | 0% | Mobile radiological units, mobile medical clinics, armored fighting vehicles (tanks) |
| II (Exempt) | Furniture & Seating | 0% | Metal-framed seats (upholstered and not), office and other metal furniture, furniture parts |
| II (Exempt) | Sporting & Leisure Goods | 0% | Physical exercise, gymnastics and athletics equipment and parts |
| II (Exempt) | Plastics Doors & Containers | 0% | Plastic doors, windows, frames; plastic buckets and pails |
| II (Exempt) | Certain Engine Parts | 0% | Outboard marine engines, tractor/vehicle compression-ignition engines, aircraft motor/generator parts |
| II (Exempt) | Electronics & Office Equipment | 0% | Parts of computers/ADP machines, certain printed circuit assemblies, photographic plates |
Q: What falls under Annex I-A — and why does the 50% rate matter so much?
A: Annex I-A covers raw and primary metal products: steel billets, slabs, and ingots; aluminum ingots, bars, and plates; copper rods and bars; and any finished article made entirely or almost entirely from these metals. At 50% on the full import value, most supply chains sourcing these materials from outside the U.S. will find costs unworkable. This tier is designed to push buyers toward domestic U.S. metal sources.
Q: What falls under Annex I-B at 25%?
A: Annex I-B covers derivative goods — products where metal is a major component but not the only value driver (think certain industrial components, consumer durables, or fabricated metal parts). The shift to full customs value is most disruptive here: previously, duties may have applied only to the metal content value; now, the 25% rate applies to the entire invoice price, including labor, overhead, and non-metal components.
Q: What is the Annex III ‘floor’ and which products does it cover?
A: Annex III was created for industrial and electrical grid equipment — products critical to infrastructure that the government does not want to make prohibitively expensive. The mechanism works as a top-up: if your product’s normal (Column 1) duty rate is below 15%, Section 232 tops it up to a minimum of 15%. If the normal duty is already 15% or higher, no Section 232 charge applies. This protection expires on December 31, 2027 — after which these products automatically move to the 25% Annex I-B rate.
Q: Is there a special rate for UK-origin goods?
A: Yes. For Annex I-B products (25% standard rate), goods of UK origin receive a 10% discount, bringing their effective Section 232 rate to 15%. This reflects the bilateral trade arrangement with the UK. No equivalent preference currently applies to EU, Japan, Korea, or other trade agreement partners under this Proclamation.
Section III — The Full Customs Value Shift
Q: What changed about how duties are calculated?
A: This is the most consequential change for many importers. Previously, Section 232 duties on finished goods were often assessed only on the value of the metal content — not the whole product. Under the new rules, duties apply to the full customs value of the imported article — the entire price you paid, including fabrication, finishing, non-metal components, and any other value added. There is no longer a ‘steel content exemption.’
Q: Can you give me a simple example of how this changes my duty bill?
A: Imagine you import a fabricated steel component priced at $100. Its steel content value is $40.
- Under the old rule (metal content only): 25% × $40 = $10 Section 232 duty.
- Under the new rule (full customs value): 25% × $100 = $25 Section 232 duty.
That is a 150% increase in your duty liability on the same product at the same price. Multiply this across a full import portfolio and the financial exposure is substantial.
Section IV — Reducing Your Duty Rate to 10%
Q: Is there a way to get a lower rate than 50% or 25%?
A: Yes — but the bar is high. For Annex I-A and I-B products, a 10% rate is available if 100% of the metal content in your product was melted and poured (steel) or smelted and cast (aluminum/copper) in the United States. You must obtain a government-recognised certificate to this effect. Partial U.S. metal content does not qualify — it is all-or-nothing.
Q: What is a ‘Melted and Poured’ or ‘Smelted and Cast’ certificate?
A: It is a certification — typically from the U.S. metal producer — confirming that the raw metal used in your product was produced in the United States at the primary production stage. For steel, this means the melt shop. For aluminum and copper, this means the primary smelter or casting facility. Your supplier must be able to provide this documentation, and it must cover all of the metal in the finished product.
Q: What should I do if I cannot get a 100% U.S.-origin certificate?
A: You will pay the standard tiered rate (50% or 25% on full customs value). You should evaluate whether: (a) you can restructure your supply chain to source metal from U.S. producers; (b) your product qualifies for a de minimis exemption; or (c) your product may fall under Annex III’s lower floor rate. Each situation requires individual analysis — contact our team for a portfolio review.
Section V — Exemptions, Special Rules & Edge Cases
Q: Are there any products that are exempt from Section 232 entirely?
A: Yes. Annex II of the Proclamation excludes certain categories from Section 232 scope altogether. These include specified chemicals, food products, consumer goods, and motorcycles. If your product falls in one of these categories, it is removed from Section 232 coverage — but you should verify the specific HTS codes against the Annex to confirm.
Q: What is the de minimis exemption and do I qualify?
A: For Annex I-B and Annex III products only, a de minimis exemption applies if: (1) your product is not classified in HTS Chapters 72, 73, 74, or 76 (the core metal chapters), and (2) the weight of the metal in your product is less than 15% of the total article weight. Both conditions must be satisfied simultaneously. This exemption does not apply to Annex I-A products.
Q: My product contains both steel and aluminum — does it get hit twice?
A: No. The Proclamation contains a single-assessment rule: if your product appears on multiple Annex lists (e.g., both steel and aluminum lists), the Section 232 duty is assessed only once, at the applicable rate for the primary classification. You will not be double-charged.
Q: What happens if my supplier uses any Russian aluminum?
A: You face a 200% duty — regardless of which Annex your product falls under. The existing Proclamation 10522 prohibitive rate on Russian aluminum remains fully in force. This applies to any article produced in Russia or containing any quantity of primary aluminum smelted or cast in Russia. Even trace amounts can trigger this rate if your supplier cannot certify Russian-origin-free metal. Due diligence on your aluminum supply chain is essential.
Q: What about Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs)?
A: New admissions to FTZs must now be made under ‘privileged foreign status.’ This is a significant change for FTZ operators, as it means the duty rate is determined at the time of admission — not at the time of entry for consumption. Goods admitted prior to the Proclamation will be subject to the new ad valorem rates when they exit the FTZ for U.S. consumption. If you operate through an FTZ, review your admissions strategy immediately.
Q: Can I claim duty drawback if I re-export products?
A: Manufacturing drawback is now strictly limited to Annex I-B and Annex III products, and only if the goods originate from a Trade Agreement Partner (UK, EU, Japan, Korea, Mexico, or Canada) using metal that was melted/poured or smelted/cast within those partner countries. Drawback on Annex I-A products and on goods from non-partner countries is no longer available. If drawback has been part of your import economics, you need to reassess your model.
Section VI — Administrative & Process Changes
Q: Can I apply to have my product excluded from Section 232?
A: The formal product inclusion/exclusion process that existed under prior regulations has been terminated. It is replaced by a rolling authority granted to the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Practically speaking, this means there is no longer a defined public process through which individual companies could petition for product-specific exclusions in the traditional sense. Metal containers — even those filled with non-metal goods — are explicitly brought within scope under this new authority.
Q: How do I know exactly which HTS codes are in each Annex?
A: The White House has published the full Annex lists. You should cross-reference your product’s HTS classification against each Annex. Our team can assist with HTS classification reviews and Annex mapping for your specific product portfolio.
Section VII — What You Should Do Now
The April 6 deadline is immediate. Do not wait for further guidance before auditing your exposure.
We recommend the following immediate steps:
- Identify every HTS code in your import portfolio and map it against Annexes I-A, I-B, and III.
- Calculate your revised duty liability under the full customs value methodology.
- Determine whether any of your products qualify for the de minimis exemption or Annex II removal.
- Audit your metal supply chain for Russian aluminum exposure — at any tier of your supplier base.
- Request ‘Melted and Poured’ / ‘Smelted and Cast’ certificates from U.S. metal suppliers if you wish to qualify for the 10% preferential rate.
- Review your FTZ admissions strategy if you operate through or ship via a Foreign Trade Zone.
- Reassess duty drawback models if you rely on manufacturing drawback for re-exported goods.
- Renegotiate supply contracts where tariff pass-through clauses may now allocate unexpected liability.
For Questions, Contact Our Team
Of Counsel SBA TradeLaw Inc., USA | Founding Partner & CEO SBA Group | Founding Partner & COO SBA Group | Senior Manager – Audit & Cost SBA Group |
Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products
By: Manu Agrawal & Arpit Bhargava
The Presidential Proclamation titled “Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States” was issued by the President of the United States on January 14, 2026, pursuant to the national security authorities under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862).
Context & Legal Foundation
- The proclamation follows a Section 232 national security investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce into the importation of processed critical minerals and their derivative products (PCMDPs).
- Under Section 232, the President may adjust imports of articles entering the U.S. when such imports are determined to be threatening to national security.
- The proclamation concludes that imports of PCMDPs are currently being brought into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair national security.
National Security Findings
- Processed critical minerals and derivative products are deemed essential to national defense, critical infrastructure, and industrial capabilities.
- The United States is highly dependent on foreign supplies of these processed minerals, even where domestic mining exists, because domestic processing capacity is insufficient.
- This reliance on imported processing exposes the U.S. to strategic vulnerabilities, supply disruptions, and foreign leverage, including from countries that dominate processing capacity globally.
Core Directive Negotiations Over Immediate Tariffs
Instead of imposing immediate tariffs or quotas, the proclamation directs a negotiated approach:
- Negotiation Mandate
- The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) are instructed to jointly pursue negotiations with trading partners to adjust PCMDP imports to mitigate identified national security risks.
- Negotiations should consider a range of potential trade terms, including price floors for critical minerals and derivative products, aimed at stabilizing markets and enhancing supply-chain resilience.
- These agreements may be structured as binding bilateral or multilateral instruments under Section 232(c)(3)(A)(i).
- B. Reporting Deadline
- Negotiators must report progress back to the President within 180 days of the proclamation’s date i.e., by mid-July 2026.
Future Trade Remedies and Conditional Measures
- The proclamation reserves the President’s authority to take additional actions if negotiations fail to achieve meaningful adjustments within the 180-day timeframe or are otherwise ineffective.
- Possible future measures include, but are not limited to:
- Minimum import price commitments for specific PCMDPs.
- Tariffs or other import adjustments designed to reduce dependence on foreign processing.
Strategic & Policy Implications
- Supply Chain Resilience
- By focusing on negotiations before tariffs, the U.S. is signaling a preference for cooperative supply-chain management with allies and trade partners, seeking to lock in diversified and secure sources of critical minerals.
- Emphasis on price floors reflects an intent to address market volatility and investment disincentives that have hampered domestic processing capacity, particularly for battery metals, rare earths, and other strategic materials.
- National Security Linkage
- Critical minerals are central to defense manufacturing, aerospace systems, energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and advanced technologies — making their reliable supply foundational for both economic and national security.
- The proclamation frames supply-chain diversification and reduced import reliance as an essential national security priority.
- Geopolitical and Commercial Effects
- Major processing hubs, particularly in Asia (e.g., China), may face increased pressure to conclude agreements that align with U.S. security and supply-chain diversification goals.
- U.S. companies with global supply dependencies may need to reassess sourcing strategies, contractual clauses, and exposure to future tariff risk if negotiations do not yield desired outcomes.
IMPACT ON TRADE
The Presidential Proclamation on processed critical minerals marks a structural shift in global trade governance. By placing critical mineral imports under Section 232 national security authority, the United States has moved this sector out of the rules-based trade system and into a security-driven regulatory framework.
Although no immediate tariffs are imposed, the permanent threat of future import restrictions introduces sustained uncertainty into global critical mineral markets. Exporters now face long-term risk that tariffs or minimum price controls may be imposed, weakening price stability, contract certainty, and investment planning.
The negotiated-access model further weakens multilateral trade norms. Market access is no longer governed primarily by WTO rules, but by strategic alignment with U.S. supply-chain priorities, accelerating the fragmentation of global trade into geopolitical blocs.
For companies, commercial competitiveness alone is no longer sufficient. Continued access to the U.S. market increasingly depends on supply-chain alignment with U.S. national security objectives, raising compliance costs and encouraging supply-chain restructuring.
Overall, the proclamation deepens the securitisation of international trade, replacing neutral market rules with conditional, power-based access in strategic sectors.
Source:
- https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/20/2026-01045/adjusting-imports-of-processed-critical-minerals-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-executive-order-ties-us-critical-minerals-security-global-partnerships
For Any Queries Kindly Connect With Us on: Arpit Bhargava / Radhika Sharma / Dr. Peter Koenig
Restoring U.S. Semiconductor Leadership Through Trade, Tariffs, and Strategic Alliances
By: Manu Agrawal & Arpit Bhargava
Background and Strategic Context
In January 2026, the United States initiated a coordinated shift in semiconductor policy aimed at restoring domestic manufacturing leadership and reducing strategic dependence on foreign supply chains. This shift combines three interconnected instruments: a major trade and investment agreement with Taiwan, the invocation of national-security tariffs under Section 232 on semiconductor imports, and a broader geopolitical realignment of high-technology supply chains. Taken together, these measures signal that semiconductors are now treated as strategic infrastructure rather than ordinary commercial goods.
The U.S.–Taiwan Semiconductor Trade and Investment Framework
The centrepiece of this strategy is the landmark U.S.–Taiwan trade and investment agreement focused on semiconductors and advanced technologies. Under the agreement, Taiwanese semiconductor and technology firms have committed to making at least USD 250 billion in new direct investments in the United States, complemented by an additional USD 250 billion in Taiwanese credit guarantees. These commitments are intended to support the construction of fabrication facilities, energy infrastructure, artificial-intelligence capacity, and research and development ecosystems within the United States.
Beyond capital flows, the agreement envisions the creation of dedicated industrial parks designed to consolidate advanced manufacturing, innovation, and upstream supply chains. The objective is not short-term capacity expansion but the long-term anchoring of a complete semiconductor ecosystem on U.S. soil, encompassing design, fabrication, equipment, and downstream integration.
Tariff Structure and Investment-Linked Market Access
The agreement also recalibrates tariff relations between the two economies. Reciprocal tariffs on Taiwanese goods entering the U.S. market are capped at 15 percent, while zero-tariff treatment is extended to selected strategic sectors, including generic pharmaceuticals, aircraft components, and certain natural resources not domestically available in the United States.
Crucially, the agreement links tariff treatment to investment behaviour. Taiwanese firms that invest in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing are granted preferential treatment under U.S. national-security trade laws, including eligibility for import allowances under Section 232. This mechanism effectively converts market access into an industrial policy tool, conditioning tariff relief on the physical presence of production capacity within the United States.
Section 232 Proclamation on Semiconductor Imports
Parallel to the cooperative Taiwan framework, the U.S. government adopted a unilateral enforcement measure through a Section 232 proclamation issued in January 2026. The Department of Commerce concluded that imports of semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products pose a threat to national security due to insufficient domestic capacity and excessive reliance on foreign suppliers.
The proclamation authorises the imposition of a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on a narrowly defined set of advanced semiconductor products. At the same time, it introduces targeted exemptions for imports that directly support U.S. industrial build-out, including equipment for domestic fabrication plants, research and development activities, and certain civilian infrastructure uses. The structure of the measure reflects an attempt to restrict dependency-creating imports while facilitating those that contribute to domestic capacity formation.
National Security and Industrial Policy Rationale
The Section 232 action is grounded in the classification of semiconductors as essential to national defence, critical infrastructure, communications networks, energy systems, and healthcare technologies. The U.S. government’s assessment emphasises that supply disruptions or foreign leverage over semiconductor inputs would pose systemic risks extending well beyond commercial markets.
By combining tariffs with exemptions linked to domestic investment, the United States is deploying Section 232 not merely as a protective instrument but as a lever to redirect global production patterns. The tariff thus functions less as a revenue-raising measure and more as a behavioural tool designed to incentivise reshoring and allied-country integration.
Geopolitical Dimensions and Taiwan’s Strategic Role
The agreement with Taiwan carries significant geopolitical implications. Taiwan occupies a central position in the global semiconductor ecosystem, particularly in advanced logic and foundry manufacturing. Deepening U.S.–Taiwan economic integration strengthens supply-chain resilience while simultaneously reinforcing strategic alignment amid intensifying U.S.–China technological competition.
By embedding Taiwanese production capacity within the United States, the agreement reduces exposure to geopolitical risk while preserving access to Taiwan’s technological expertise. This dual objective of risk mitigation and alliance consolidation underscores the broader strategic logic behind the deal.
Implications for Global Trade and Technology Governance
Taken together, the U.S.–Taiwan agreement and the Section 232 semiconductor measures mark a decisive evolution in U.S. trade policy. Market access in high-technology sectors is increasingly conditioned on strategic alignment, domestic capacity building, and national-security considerations rather than solely on price competitiveness or traditional comparative advantage.
For exporters, investors, and governments, the semiconductor sector now serves as a template for future U.S. trade governance. Access to the U.S. market will increasingly depend on participation in U.S. industrial rebuilding efforts, signalling a shift toward a hybrid model where trade liberalisation, industrial policy, and national security are deeply intertwined.
Source:
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/adjusting-imports-of-semiconductors-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states/
- https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-taiwan-reach-trade-deal-focused-semiconductors-commerce-department-says-2026-01-15/
For Any Queries Kindly Connect With Us on: Arpit Bhargava / Radhika Sharma / Dr. Peter Koenig
Applications Filed by LDGE Fair Trade Coalition Seeking the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Large Diameter Graphite Electrodes from India and China
1. Background and Overview
On February 24, 2026, applications seeking the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on imports of large diameter graphite electrodes from China and India were filed before the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. The applications were submitted by the LDGE Fair Trade Coalition, which represents the entirety of U.S. domestic production. The U.S. authorities are currently required to examine the applications to determine whether the statutory requirements for initiation are satisfied.
2. Period of Investigation
- Dumping and Subsidy Period of Investigation Department of Commerce 1st January, 2025 to 31st December, 2025.
- Injury Period U S International Trade Commission 1st January, 2023 to 31st December, 2025.
3. Petitioners and Domestic Industry Support
The petitions were filed by Tokai Carbon GE LLC and Resonac Graphite America Inc and are supported by GrafTech International Ltd a former U S producer. Petitioners account for 100 percent of U S large diameter graphite electrode production thereby satisfying the statutory standing requirements under U S trade law.
4. Indian Exporters & Producers
Identified in the Petition (add Chinese exporters)
- Graphite and Carbon Industries India Private Limited, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India.
- Graphite India Ltd., Kolkata, West Bengal, India.
- HEG Ltd., Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India.
5. Product Scope
Covered Merchandise
The investigations cover
- Large diameter graphite electrodes finished or unfinished
- Electrodes exceeding 425 millimeters 16 point 7 inches in nominal or actual diameter
- Electrodes with or without graphite pin joining systems
- Electrodes imported assembled or separately
For purposes of the investigation the country of origin is determined by the country of graphitization which is a critical factor for scope and circumvention analysis.
Indicative HTSUS classifications include 8545.11.0020, 3801.10.5090, and 3801.90.0050, though the written scope description is dispositive.
6. Trade Volumes
| Source/ Year | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Jan-Nov 2024 | Jan-Nov 2025 |
| India | 3,543 | 2,082 | 2,294 | 2,162 | 792 |
| China | 3,957 | 4,950 | 5,947 | 4,629 | 3,564 |
| Total Imports | 45,961 | 30,980 | 25,920 | 22,163 | 20,497 |
*all data is in metric tons
7. Key Allegations
I. Antidumping Allegations
Alleged dumping margins are as follows;
China
Alleged dumping margins exceeding 36.82 percent to over 146.41 percent including very high transaction specific margins due to constructed normal value methodologies.
India
Alleged dumping margins range approximately from 42.92 percent to over 74.02 percent depending on the producer exporter and product configuration and if accepted even in part may result in very high provisional cash deposit requirements at the preliminary determination stage.
II. Countervailing Duty Allegations
The petitions allege that producers in China and India benefit from actionable government subsidies including:
- Preferential financing and state backed lending
- Provision of inputs including raw materials and energy at less than adequate remuneration
Tax incentives and regional development programs - Export linked and performance-based incentive schemes
- Purchase of Coal at less than adequate remuneration (LTAR)
The petitions emphasize the capital intensive and energy intensive nature of graphite electrode production which magnifies the impact of subsidization.
8. Injury Allegations
The U S International Trade Commission is examining whether imports from China and India have increased significantly in absolute and relative volume have undercut suppressed and depressed U S prices and have reduced capacity utilization profitability and market share of the domestic industry while also creating a threat of material injury due to excess capacity and export orientation of foreign producers. Petitioners further assert that large diameter graphite electrodes constitute a single domestic like product distinct from small diameter graphite electrodes due to differences in technical characteristics and end use applications.
9. Commercial Impact on Exporters and Importers
If affirmative determinations are made preliminary antidumping and countervailing duties may be imposed within months of initiation with potential retroactive duty exposure in the event of a critical circumstances finding. Exporters will be required to respond to extensive Department of Commerce questionnaires covering sales cost and subsidy information and any failure to cooperate may result in the application of adverse facts available with combined antidumping and countervailing duty rates becoming commercially prohibitive.
10. Times and action points
Submission of ITC Preliminary Questionnaires – March 10, 2026
ITC Preliminary hearing – March 17, 2026
ITC Preliminary Vote – April 9, 2026 (Determines if case will go forward)
SBA’s team of trade experts is closely tracking developments at the U.S. ITC and the U.S. Department of Commerce and stands ready to support businesses as they navigate this evolving and complex trade landscape.
U.S. Initiates Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Citric Acid Imports from India and Canada
Product: Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts
Countries Concerned: India and Canada
Investigating Authorities: U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)
Period of Investigation: January 1, 2025 – December 31, 2025
Background and Overview
The U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission have formally initiated parallel antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations on imports of citric acid and certain citrate salts from India and Canada under Sections 731 and 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
These investigations follow petitions filed by major U.S. producers alleging unfair pricing and subsidization by foreign exporters. If affirmative determinations are made, additional duties may be imposed on imports from both countries, with significant implications for market access and pricing.
Case Details
Investigation Type | India Case No. | Canada Case No. |
Antidumping (AD) | A-533-946 | A-122-877 |
Countervailing Duty (CVD) | C-533-947 | C-122-878 |
Product Scope
The investigations cover anhydrous and hydrous citric acid, sodium and potassium citrate, calcium citrate intermediates, and blends containing 40 percent or more citric acid or citrate content. Indicative HTSUS classifications include 2918.14, 2918.15, and 3824.99, though classification alone does not determine scope coverage.
Key Allegations
Antidumping Allegations
Petitioners allege that Indian exporters sold subject merchandise in the U.S. at less than fair value, with alleged dumping margins ranging from 58.99 percent to 252.37 percent, based on constructed cost-based normal values and U.S. customs data, indicating a high likelihood of substantial provisional duties.
Countervailing Duty Allegations
The petition alleges that Indian exporters benefit from actionable subsidies, including export incentives (Duty Drawback, Advance Authorization, EPCG, MEIS), preferential financing (EXIM Bank support and interest equalization), and tax and renewable energy incentives, which may result in countervailing duties if substantiated.
The petition also alleges transnational subsidization, claiming that Indian exporters benefit indirectly from subsidized inputs sourced from China.
Injury Allegations
The USITC is examining whether imports from India and Canada have caused or threaten material injury through increased volumes, price undercutting and suppression, loss of market share, and declining sales and profitability, with an affirmative finding required for duties to be imposed.
Major Indian Exporter Identified
Daffodil Pharmachem Pvt. Ltd. has been identified as the largest Indian exporter, accounting for approximately 60 percent of subject imports. Please find attached the list of all the exporters at the end.
Commercial Impact on Exporters
Affected exporters may face significant provisional and final duties, possible retroactive liability, heightened scrutiny of costs and sourcing, increased compliance burdens, and adverse facts available for non-cooperation, with cumulative AD and CVD rates potentially affecting pricing and contract viability.
Conclusion
The initiation of AD and CVD investigations on citric acid from India and Canada presents substantial duty exposure, with alleged dumping margins exceeding 250 percent and novel transnational subsidy claims.
Exporters should treat this case as strategically significant and adopt proactive compliance and litigation strategies to mitigate adverse outcomes.
List of Indian Exporters During the Period of Investigation
S.No. | Name of the Exporters | Sum of Metric Tons |
1. | A R Chemical | 401.00 |
2. | Acaris Health LLP | 736.53 |
3. | Amogha Oil Tools Private Limited | 22.04 |
4. | Buradon Inc | 14.69 |
5. | Chemical Crunch Private Limited | 226.41 |
6. | Cocreate Global Tech Private Limited | 143.86 |
7. | Daffodil Pharmachem Private Limted | 9,507.52 |
8. | Dorf Ketal Chemicals India Limited` | 32.93 |
9. | Euroasia Trans Continental | 4.23 |
10. | Geocon Products | 1,601.30 |
11. | Hartman Enterprises LLP | 20.80 |
12. | Hexagon Supplies LLP | 40.78 |
13. | India Phosphate & Allied | 40.50 |
14. | Indiana Chem Port | 14.39 |
15. | Kamataz Sourcing & Consulting Private Limited | 9.61 |
16. | Kronox Lab Sciences Limited | 165.68 |
17. | Mass Dye Chem Private Limited | 35.90 |
18. | Medilane Healthcare Private Limited | 40.08 |
19. | Meru Chem Private Limited | 45.01 |
20. | Mireca International | 496.34 |
21. | Nature Bio | 984.56 |
22. | Not Declared | 1,184.30 |
23. | NRS Chemical LLP | 206.86 |
24. | PHS Life Sciences Private Limited | 19.80 |
25. | Prachin Chemical | 106.25 |
26. | Pure Trueherb Private Limited | 20.52 |
27. | Shanpar Industries Private Limited | 49.84 |
28. | Smile Seller International | 248.18 |
29. | Stenfy Chem | 463.68 |
30. | Sunil Chemicals | 10.04 |
31. | Synthocure Pharma LLP | 4.14 |
32. | V Care Medicines | 16.09 |
33. | Valaji Pharma Chem | 0.02 |
34. | Vcare Medicines | 16.09 |
35. | Wang Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals | 180.62 |
36. | Xitrical Group Co. Limited | 38.14 |
The top 5 Indian Exporters are :
Name of the Exporter | Total Percent |
Daffodil Pharmachem Private Limted | 59.6% |
Geocon Products | 10.0% |
Nature Bio | 6.2% |
Acaris Health LLP | 4.6% |
Mireca International | 3.1% |
For Any Queries Kindly Connect With Us on: Arpit Bhargava / Radhika Sharma / Dr. Peter Koenig
U.S. Withdrawal from International Organizations
By Manu Agrawal, Arpit Bhargava & Dr. Peter Koenig
The Decision
On January 7, 2026, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from 66 international organizations, conventions, and treaties; one of the most extensive retreats from multilateral engagement in modern American history.
What’s Happening
Following a comprehensive review mandated by Executive Order 14199 (February 2025), the administration concluded that many international commitments conflict with American sovereignty, economic priorities, and what it calls “globalist agendas.”
Key requirements:
- Immediate implementation by all federal agencies
- End of financial contributions and active participation in UN entities
- Ongoing review of additional international commitments
Organizations Affected
The memorandum targets 66 entities across two broad categories, representing a significant withdrawal from climate, democracy, human rights, and technical cooperation frameworks.
The U.S. will withdraw from 31 UN-affiliated bodies spanning climate policy, population issues, democracy support, conflict prevention, human rights, and technical programs as well as 35 Non UN-affiliated bodies focused on climate action, renewable energy, digital governance and democratic institutions.
Administration’s Rationale
- Sovereignty: Organizations infringe on American autonomy
- Fiscal responsibility: Redirect funds to infrastructure, defence, and border security
- Effectiveness: Many bodies promote ideologically driven initiatives that misuse taxpayer funds
- America First: Reject “globalist agendas” in favour of national interests
Broader Context
This continues previous withdrawals from the WHO, Paris Agreement, and UN Human Rights Council, now expanded to organizations covering climate action, scientific cooperation, migration, human rights, democracy promotion, and peacebuilding.
Impact on International Trade
The U.S. withdrawal from international organizations and treaty frameworks carries significant, though largely indirect, consequences for global trade and U.S. commercial interests. By stepping back from UN affiliated bodies and multilateral forums that shape norms on climate policy, sustainability, digital governance, and technical cooperation, the United States reduces its influence over trade relevant rulemaking. This enables other major economies, particularly the European Union and China, to exert greater influence over standards that increasingly determine market access for U.S. exporters, potentially leading to divergent regulatory approaches across markets.
Diminished U.S. engagement is likely to intensify regulatory fragmentation, increasing compliance costs through parallel standards, duplicative testing and certification, and supply chain inefficiencies. These effects will be uneven, with technology and digital sectors facing heightened exposure due to their reliance on interoperable standards and cross border data flows.
Withdrawal from climate focused institutions poses more immediate risks, as carbon related trade measures, including the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanisms, may raise costs for U.S. exports in carbon intensive sectors such as steel, aluminium, cement, and chemicals. Reduced participation also limits U.S. influence over the design and application of such measures.
Overall, the shift signals a move away from multilateral, rules based trade governance toward unilateral and bilateral strategies. While offering short term flexibility, it risks weakening long term predictability in the global trading system and ceding rule setting influence on other factors.
List of United Nations Organizations
S. No. | Organization |
1 | Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
2 | UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – Economic Commission for Africa |
3 | ECOSOC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean |
4 | ECOSOC – Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
5 | ECOSOC – Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia |
6 | International Law Commission |
7 | International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals |
8 | Internation Trade Centre |
9 | Office of the Special Advisor on Africa |
10 | Office of the Special Representative of the Secretrary-General for Children in Armed Conflict |
11 | Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict |
12 | Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary_General on Violence Against Children |
13 | Peacebuilding Commission |
14 | Peacebuilding Fund |
15 | Permanent Forum on People of African Descent |
16 | UN Alliance of Civilizations |
17 | UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries |
18 | UN Conference on Trade and Development |
19 | UN Democracy Fund |
20 | UN Energy |
21 | UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |
22 | UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) |
23 | UN Human Settlements Programme |
24 | UN Institute for Training and Research |
25 | UN Oceans |
26 | UN Population Fund |
27 | UN Register of Conventional Arms |
28 | UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination |
29 | UN System Staff College |
30 | UN Water |
31 | UN University |
List of Non – United Nations Organizations
S.No. | Organization |
1 | 24/7 Carbon-Free Energy Compact |
2 | Colombo Plan Council |
3 | Commission for Environmental Cooperation |
4 | Education Cannot Wait |
5 | European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Treats |
6 | Forum or European National Highway Research Laboratories |
7 | Freedom Online Coalition |
8 | Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund |
9 | Global Counterterrorism Forum |
10 | Global Forum on Cyber Expertise |
11 | Global Forum on Migration and Development |
12 | Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research |
13 | Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, metals and Sustainable Development |
14 | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
15 | Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services |
16 | International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property |
17 | International Cotton Advisory Committee |
18 | International Development Law Organization |
19 | International Energy Forum |
20 | International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies |
21 | International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance |
22 | International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law |
23 | International Lead and Zinc Study Group |
24 | International Renewable Energy Agency |
25 | International Solar Alliance |
26 | International Tropical Timber Organization |
27 | International Union for Conservation of Nature |
28 | Pan American Institute of Geography and History |
29 | Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation |
30 | Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia |
31 | Regional Cooperation Council |
32 | Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century |
33 | Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine |
34 | Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme |
35 | Venice Commission of the Council of Europe |
Source:
For Any Queries Kindly Connect With Us on: Arpit Bhargava / Radhika Sharma / Dr. Peter Koenig
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